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The security of source has become an increasingly important issue in quantum cryptogra-
phy. Based on the framework of measurement-device-independent quantum-key-distribution (MDI-
QKD), the source becomes the only region exploitable by a potential eavesdropper (Eve). Phase
randomization is a cornerstone assumption in most discrete-variable (DV-) quantum communication
protocols (e.g., QKD, quantum coin tossing, weak coherent state blind quantum computing, and so
on), and the violation of such an assumption is thus fatal to the security of those protocols. In this
paper, we show a simple quantum hacking strategy, with commercial and homemade pulsed lasers,
by Eve that allows her to actively tamper with the source and violate such an assumption, without
leaving a trace afterwards. Furthermore, our attack may also be valid for continuous-variable (CV-)
QKD, which is another main class of QKD protocol, since, excepting the phase random assumption,
other parameters (e.g., intensity) could also be changed, which directly determine the security of
CV-QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] allows two re-
mote parties to share an unconditional secret key, which
has been proven in theory [2–4] and demonstrated in ex-
periment [5]. However, the imperfections of practical de-
vices will compromise the security of QKD systems [6–
14]. So far, three main approaches have been proposed
to bridge the gap between theory and practice. The first
one is to close specific loopholes of devices with security
patches [15], but it could not close potential and unno-
ticed loopholes. The second one is device-independent
(DI-) QKD [16–18]. By testing Bells inequality in a
loophole-free setting, security could be obtained without
detailed information about the implementation devices.
But DI-QKD is impractical because an almost perfect
single photon detector (SPD) is required, and even so the
secret key rate is limited [19, 20]. The third approach is
to remove as many device loopholes and assumptions as
possible by either modifying the QKD protocol or refining
the security proof. One of the best results with this ap-
proach is measurement-device-independent (MDI-) QKD
[21], which can remove all detector loopholes. Since the
detection system is widely regarded as the Achilles’ heel
of QKD [6, 8, 9, 13], MDI-QKD is of great importance.
Indeed, recently, MDI-QKD has been demonstrated both
in the laboratory and in the field [22].
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Based on the framework of MDI-QKD, the source be-
comes the final battlefield for the legitimate parties and
Eve. And the major flaw of the source is that a semicon-
ductor laser diode (S-LD), which generates a weak co-
herent state, is normally used as a single photon source
in most commercial and research QKD systems [5, 22].
The security of MDI-QKD as well as BB84 based on S-
LD has been proven with decoy state [23]. Hence, it has
been convinced that if the source can be well character-
ized (for example the source flaws could be taken care of
with the loss-tolerant QKD protocol [24]), perfect secu-
rity can still be obtained.
Generally speaking, there are two main classes of QKD
protocols, one is discrete-variable (DV-) QKD (includ-
ing BB84, decoy state BB84, MDI-QKD, Scarani-Acin-
Ribordy-Gisin (SARG04) [25], differential phase shift
(DPS) [26], and so on) , and the other one is continuous-
variable (CV-) QKD [27]. In most DV- quantum commu-
nication protocols (e.g., DV-QKD, quantum coin tossing
(QCT) [28], weak coherent state blind quantum comput-
ing (BQC) [29]), the phase randomization is a corner-
stone assumption. By assuming that the overall phase
is uniformly distributed from 0 to 2pi (in fact, discrete
randomization with finite points, e.g., 10, is sufficient to
guarantee QKD security [30]), a coherent state with in-
tensity |α|2 is reduced into a classical mixture state, that
is ρ =
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
2pi
|αeiθ〉〈αeiθ| =
∑∞
n=0
e−|α|
2
|α|2n
n!
|n〉〈n|. Then
it allows one to apply classical statistics theory to analyze
quantum mechanics. Note that although the security of
QKD with nonrandom phase had been proven [31], the
performance is very limited in distance and key rate.
In this paper, however, we demonstrate a simple quan-
tum hacking strategy, with both a commercial and home-
2made pulsed laser based on S-LD, that allows Eve to ac-
tively violate the phase randomization assumption, with-
out leaving a trace afterwards. Thus it is effective for
most of DV- quantum communication protocols. Our
attack may also be effective for CV-QKD, since other
parameters of the source (e.g., intensity) could also be
changed. For example, it had been proven that the local
oscillator fluctuation will compromise the security of CV-
QKD [14]. Since S-LDs are widely used in most quantum
information protocols (e.g., DV-QKD, CV-QKD, QCT,
BQC, and so on), and the security of these protocols is
closely related to S-LD’s parameters [4], our work consti-
tutes an important step towards secure quantum infor-
mation processing.
Our attack differs from previous attacks [6–14]. First,
in our attack, Eve actively violate some basic assump-
tions required in the security proof by tampering with
an initial perfect source. Second, unlike the laser damage
attack [13] in which Eve also actively creates loopholes
for a perfect SPD, the loopholes created by our attack
are temporary, this makes our attack impossible for Al-
ice and Bob to detect during the off-time of the QKD
system. Third, our attack also differs from the Trojan-
horse attack [32, 33]. In our attack, Eve directly break
some basic assumptions of QKD protocols, whereas in
the Trojan horse attack, back-reflected light is measured
to analyze Alice’s information. And as the best we know,
the Trojan horse attack is invalid for Alice with multi-
lasers [34], but our attack remains applicable to such sys-
tems. Fourth and most importantly, our attack targets
the source instead of SPD. This makes our attack a seri-
ous threat for most quantum information protocols (not
only QKD, but also QCT and BQC).
Here we emphasize that the phase randomization is a
cornerstone assumption in the security of many quan-
tum communication protocols including QKD, QCT and
BQC. It is important for not only weak coherent pulse
based protocols, but also, for instance, parametric down
conversion based protocols [35]. And continuous or dis-
crete phase randomization is also crucial for the loss-
tolerant protocol [24]. In fact, without the phase ran-
domization, the performance of a quantum communica-
tion protocol will be dramatically reduced in distance and
key rate [31]. However, we demonstrate experimentally
in a clear manner how easy it is for Eve to violate such
a fundamental assumption in a practical setting. Thus
our work is very generality for most of quantum informa-
tion processing protocols. It works for most DV-QKD,
with various encoding schemes (polarization, phase and
time-bin) and various kinds of lasers (pulsed laser and
continuous wave (cw) laser). It is also possibly a seri-
ous threat for CV-QKD and other quantum information
processing protocols (such as QCT and BQC).
The basic principle of our attack is as follows. In the
inter-driven mode, the semiconductor medium of the S-
LD is excited from loss to gain by each driving current
pulse. A laser pulse is generated from seed photons origi-
nating from spontaneous emission. The phase of the laser
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Schematic setup of our experiment.
Part(a) shows Eve’s control devices, in which Eve uses a con-
tinuous wave (cw) laser to tamper with the parameters of
Alice’s pulsed signal laser. Part(b) shows the experimental
setups to measure the parameters of Alice’s signal pulses. The
phase of adjacent pulse is measured by an unbalanced Mach-
Zehnder interferometer [lower arm of part(b)]. And the wave-
form of Alice’s signal pulse is directly measured with a photo-
diode [upper arm of part(b)]. The output of photodiodes (D0
and D1) are recorded with an oscilloscope. Cir.: circulator;
PC: polarization controller; Pol.: polarizer; BS: beam splitter.
Solid lines are optical fibers (single-mode fiber for black color
and polarization-maintaining fiber for red color), and dashed
lines are electrical lines. Here we consider Eve’s control laser
working at continuous wave (cw) mode. However, in later
parts of this paper, we will consider the possibility that Eve
modulates her control laser into short photon pulses. This
can make it harder for Alice to detect Eve’s attack.
pulse is determined by the seed photons. Since the phase
of the seed photons is random, the phase of each laser
pulse is random inherently [36–39]. However, if a certain
number of photons are injected from an external source
into the semiconductor medium, these photons will also
be amplified to generate laser pulses. Consequently, the
seed photons consist of two parts: one from spontaneous
emission and the other part from the external source.
Both parts will affect the phase of the resulting laser
pulse. If the injected photons greatly outnumber the pho-
tons from spontaneous emission, the phase of the output
laser pulse is largely determined by the phase of the in-
jected photons. Therefore, Eve can control the phase of
Alice’s signal laser by illuminating the S-LD from an ex-
ternal ‘control source’, and successfully violate the phase
randomization assumption.
II. EXPERIMENT AND MAIN RESULTS
Figure 1 shows the schematic setup of our experi-
ment. We test four sample S-LDs operating in inter-
driven mode, two ID300 pulsed lasers from IdQuantique
[40] (numbers ID300-1 and ID300-2), and two homemade
pulsed lasers with S-LDs from Sunstar Communication
Technology CoLtd (model: SDLP55HMBIFPN, numbers
HM-1 and HM-2). To measure the phase relationship
between adjacent pulses, an unbalanced Mach-Zehnder
interferometer is used (see Fig.1(b)). The repetition rate
of the signal laser is set to be 206.34MHz to match the
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Experimental results for normalized
intensity distribution of V sP . Pc is the power of Eve’s control
laser. Parts(a)-(d) show the intensity distribution of four S-
LDs with Eve’s different control intensities. Part(e) shows the
theoretical simulation (dashed line) of the probability distri-
bution when the phase of each pulse follows a uniform distri-
bution from 0 to 2pi, and the experimental results of ID300-1
(solid line) when Eve is absent. These results clearly show
that when photons are injected into Alice’s signal laser, the
phase of the signal laser becomes correlated. Here Pc is not
minimized for Eve [41], and a further experiment about the
minimal power is discussed in the following text (see Fig.4).
delay of the interferometer. The output light is detected
by a photodiode (D0) with a bandwidth of 1 GHz, and
the voltage of each pulse is recorded using an oscilloscope
with bandwidth 33 GHz and sample rate 80 GHz (Agi-
lent, model: DSOX93304Q).
Because the central frequency (with a finite linewidth)
and polarization of the signal laser are unstable in ex-
periment, Eve needs to carefully modulate the frequency
and polarization of her control laser to match her con-
trol laser with Alice’s signal laser. In our experiment,
a tuning laser module (model: 81600B-201, Agilent) is
used as Eve’s control laser. Furthermore, in Fig.1 of the
main text, we consider Eve’s control laser working at cw
mode. However, at the end of this paper, we consider
the possibility that Eve modulates her control laser into
short photon pulses. This can reduce Alice’s ability to
detect Eve’s attack.
In theory, the output voltage after D0 is VP ∝ [1 +
cos(∆φ + θ0)]/2, where ∆φ is the phase difference be-
tween adjacent pulses, and θ0 is the inherent phase dif-
ference between the two paths of the interferometer.
By passively controlling the interferometer with tem-
perature controller and vibration isolator, we can sta-
bilize the interferometer within about 2 minute. In
the test we set the number of pulses to be 25791 in
each experimental point of Fig.2 (In each experimen-
tal point of Fig.2, we collect and store 10M data. Note
that the repetition rate of the laser is 206.34 MHz and
the sample rate of oscilloscope is 80GHz. The num-
ber of data is about (1/206.34MHz)/(1/80GHz)≈ 388 in
each pulse cycle. Thus the number of pulses is about
10M/388 ≈ 25791.), and the time interval is about 0.125
ms (25791/206.34MHz), which is much lower than the
time scale of the interferometer. Thus we could set
V sP ∝ [1 + sin(∆φ)]/2 for θ0 = pi/2.
A uniform distribution of ∆φ from 0 to 2pi will pro-
duce a U-type intensity distribution, owing to the fact
that the mapping from phase to intensity is non-linear,
VP ∝ sin(∆φ). Indeed when Eve is absent, the same
distributions (solid lines of Fig.2) are obtained in ex-
periments with both ID-300 and the homemade pulsed
laser. However, a bright light from Eve could correlate
the phase of each pulse and violate the phase random-
ization assumption (dashed lines of Fig.2). In fact, when
photons are injected into Alice’s signal laser, the intensity
distribution of V sP for both ID300 and the homemade sig-
nal laser becomes Gaussian. Consequently, various quan-
tum hacking strategies can be applied to spy on the final
key [42]. Figure 3(a) shows a schematic setup to attack
a complete QKD system.
Theoretically speaking, Eve can perfectly control the
phase of Alice’s source, and then the intensity distribu-
tion should be a sharp line. However, owing to the follow-
ing two main reasons, the measured intensity distribution
in Fig.2 of the main text follows Gaussian distribution:
(1) There exists phase noise in Eve’s controlling laser,
which follows Gaussian distribution. The measured in-
tensity is the interference of adjacent pulses (the interval
of adjacent pulses is about 5ns), thus the experimental
results depends on the phase noise of Eve’s control laser
at different time. (2) The interference is imperfect, in-
cluding the loss of two paths of the interferometer, the
time jitter of optical pulse, and so on. Therefore, a practi-
cal Eve can’t perfectly control the phase of Alice’s source,
and the phase noise decides how much information will be
leaked to Eve. Furthermore, although the security of the
BB84 protocol had been proven based on uniformed ran-
dom phase from 0 to 2pi [4] and nonrandom phase [31],
but the key rate (or mutual information between Alice
and Eve) is still unknown, if the phase of source follows
Gaussian distribution or a general probability distribu-
tion, which will be studied in future.
Furthermore, we note that when the LD is operated
in inter driven mode, the emitted pulses have random
phase, and such phase noise had been used as a quan-
tum random number generator by many groups [36–39].
However, Fig.2(e) of the main text does not prove that
the phase of each pulse follows uniform distribution from
0 to 2pi. In fact, if the phase is uniformly distributed
from 0 to pi, the same probability distribution could also
be obtained. Thus, the phase randomization assumption
must be carefully evaluated, particularly for a high-speed
QKD system [39]. Active phase randomization [44] is a
good countermeasure to guarantee the phase randomiza-
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FIG. 3: (Color online) (a) Principle scheme to attack a com-
plete QKD system by combining our attack with those of
[42]. s is Alice’s quantum signal pulse. Eve splits her bright
control pulse into two parts with a beam splitter (BS1), one
part serves as control laser to tamper with the parameters of
Alice’s signal pulse, while the other part serves as phase refer-
ence for Eve to perform the source attack [42]. (b) A possible
countermeasure for Alice to monitor our attack. Alice splits
parts of the light with BS2 and monitors the power with a
photodetector. The optical frequency filter is used to remove
all wavelength-dependent flaw of Alice’s source. The isola-
tor (Iso.) is used to prevent light from entering Alice’s lab
from the quantum channel. (c) Active phase randomization
scheme (PR.), which can guarantee the phase randomization
assumption and partially reduce the risk of our attack, but it
can not entirely remove our attack (see text for detail).
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FIG. 4: (Color online) (a) Experimental results for V sP , when a
25dB isolator is placed after the signal laser ID300-1. (b) The
standard deviation of V sP ∝ sin(∆φ) and V
c
P ∝ cos(∆φ) with
different powers of control light. The standard deviation has
been normalized by that of Pc = 0. The experimental results
clearly show that, even if a 25dB isolator is used by Alice,
the intensity distribution is still Gaussian-type but not U-
type when Eve uses a cw laser with a power of 0.6mW , which
means that Eve could still introduce a nonrandom phase in
Alice’s quantum signal. In the test, only a 25dB isolator is
put after the output of Alice (the photodetector and the filter
will be discussed later). Other setups used here are the same
as those for Fig.2.
tion assumption.
III. COUNTERMEASURE
Figure 3(b) shows a possible countermeasure for Alice
to monitor our attack. It includes three main devices, an
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Measured signal pulse waveforms when
Alice’s signal laser is illuminated by a bright light. Eve sends
a bright cw light to Alice’s signal lasers (including both com-
mercial and homemade pulsed lasers), then the signal pulse
of Alice is directly measured using a photodiode (D1) with
bandwidth 40GHz, an oscilloscope with bandwidth 33GHz
and sample rate 80GHz (model: DSOX93303Q, Agilent). The
repetition rate of the signal laser is 10MHz. It is clearly seen
that when Alice’s signal laser is illuminated, the pulse ampli-
tude and width will be changed.
isolator (Iso.), a filter and a photodetector. But these de-
vices could not defeat our attack completely, if they are
not carefully configured (see Appendix A for details). (1)
The isolator could not entirely stop Eve’s photons due to
its finite isolation (see Fig.4), and other imperfections
of practical isolators have been found in a recent paper
[33]. (2) Since the wavelength of Eve’s control laser is the
same as that of Alice’s signal laser in our attack, an op-
tical frequency filter is also ineffective. (3) Both optical
power meter and classical photodetector could be foiled
by Eve, so that they could not accurately show the power
of light from the channel. For example, a short pulse light
might reduce the average power of Eve’s light, and the
finite bandwidth of these monitor devices might worsen
the monitoring results. Furthermore, a recent paper also
shows other imperfections of a practical monitoring pho-
todetector [43].
An active phase randomization (Fig.3(c)) [44], or the
cw laser followed by an external intensity modulator and
an active phase randomization scheme, is another impor-
tant choice for practical QKD systems, especially when
the QKD system works in a high repetition rate [39].
Then phase randomization assumption is automatically
guaranteed. But such a countermeasure may not remove
our attack entirely, since Eve can tamper with other pa-
rameters (e.g., intensity and shape, see Fig.5) to com-
promise the security of such systems. For example, the
5key rate of both CV-QKD and DV-QKD depends on the
intensity of the signal pules [14, 45, 46]. But the stabil-
ity of S-LD (no matter whether it works on pulsed mode
or cw mode) could be damaged by bright light, so that
the intensity of Alice’s laser is unstable. Therefore, in
this sense, our attack is also effective for the QKD sys-
tem with a cw laser and an active phase randomization
scheme. Another countermeasure is to use a protocol (or
security proof) with an unrandom phase, but the per-
formance of such a protocol is dramatically reduced in
distance and key rate[31].
IV. DISCUSSION
Fig.5 shows that the pulse shape would also be changed
by Eve’s bright light. These changed parameters are also
helpful. For example, the signal pulse is emitted earlier
than that without Eve [47], and the time shift is different
for each S-LDs. Furthermore, in the absence of an exter-
nal field, the first oscillation is much stronger than the fol-
lowing oscillation, and a few oscillations appear [48]. But
when Eve is present, more oscillations are observed, and
different laser diodes have different oscillation waveform.
Thus it is possible for Eve to compromise the security
of QKD systems with multi-lasers [34] by measuring the
characters of signal pules (e.g., time-shift, pulse width,
optical frequency).
Here we remark that, generally speaking, the changes
of pulse shape are helpful for both Eve and Alice. Al-
though more imperfection could be exploited by Eve,
more parameters could be monitored by Alice to discover
the existence of Eve. In fact, both Eve and Alice must be
very careful in the cat-and-mouse game (see Appendix B
for details). First, if Alice wants to completely monitor
the changes of pulse shape, some advanced devices with
high speed and bandwidth are required, which may dra-
matically increase the technology challenge and cost of
a practical Alice. Second, Eve could carefully configure
her attack to ensure that her attack could not increase
the error rate and the changes of pulse shape could not
be discovered by Alice. Third, generally speaking, the
changed shape may actually benefit Eve more than Al-
ice and Bob. This is because Eve could well be a spy
or national security agency such as the NSA and so Eve
has a much larger power and budget than Alice and Bob.
Thus Eve is probably at a better position to exploit the
imperfections that she has introduced in the quantum
signal. Furthermore, note that even a tiny violation of
the phase randomization assumption or other parameters
of the source will undermine the very foundation of secu-
rity proofs in QKD and it will no longer be fair for Alice
and Bob to claim unconditional security.
Finally, in addition to using a laser, Eve can also at-
tack the QKD system by using temperature, microwave
radiation, and so on. At the same time, although most
quantum hackers focus on the optical devices of the legit-
imate parties, Eve can also exploit imperfections in the
electrical devices of the QKD system. For example, if the
electromagnetic shielding of devices of Alice and Bob is
imperfect, Eve could use microwave radiation from out-
side to control the parameters of these devices. These
are the subjects of future investigations.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, phase randomization is a cornerstone as-
sumption for many quantum communication protocols,
and a tiny violation of such an assumption is fatal to
the security of such protocols. However, here we demon-
strate experimentally, with both commercial and home-
made pulsed lasers, how easy it is for Eve to violate such
a fundamental assumption in a practical setting. Ad-
ditionally, besides the random phase, other parameters
(e.g., intensity) of the source could also be changed. Our
attack works for most DV-QKD protocols, and possibly
for CV-QKD and other quantum information processing
protocols (e.g., QCT and BQC). Thus our work consti-
tutes an important step towards secure quantum infor-
mation processing.
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Appendix A: The scheme for Eve to foil Alice’s
monitor devices
Now we show that Alice’s countermeasure, shown in
Fig.3(b), of the main text (include an isolator, an opti-
cal filter, and a photodetector), can’t remove our attack
entirely.
(i) Isolator- In general, an optical isolator serves to
prevent back-reflected photons from returning to Alice’s
lab. However, owing to the finite isolation of practical
isolators, this approach only reduces the probability that
photons infuse into Alice’s zone, but can not eliminate
this probability entirely. We perform a proof-of-principle
experiment, by inserting a 25dB isolator after the out-
put port of the signal laser ID300-1. The experimental
results of Fig.4 of the main text show that the intensity
distribution is still Gaussian-type but not U-type when
Eve uses a cw laser with a power of 0.6mW . Thus the
phase of adjacent pulses can be still correlated. Although
isolation of some commercial isolators reaches 50dB (or
Alice can use two or more isolators in series to increase
the isolation), it can not totally foil our attack, because
6Eve can always increase the power of her control laser.
Furthermore, other imperfections of the practical isolator
have been found in a recent paper [33].
(ii) Filter- An optical frequency filter is often used by
Alice to remove any wavelength-dependent flaws. By do-
ing so, only the light within a narrow band of frequencies
can enter Alice’s lab. However, the wavelength of Eve’s
control laser is the same as that of Alice’s signal laser in
our attack. Thus, an optical frequency filter is not an
effective countermeasure against our attack.
(iii) Photodetector- Alice can use both an optical power
meter and photodetector to monitor the intensity of light
from a quantum channel, but the optical power meter
measures the average power of light. Thus it could be
foiled by Eve who uses a pulsed laser. For example, Fig.4
of the main text shows that a cw laser with an optical
power 0.6mW is sufficient to correlate the phase of Al-
ice’s signal pulse. Now, suppose that the repetition rate
of the QKD system is 10MHz, and Eve uses a pulsed
control laser with width of 100ps. Then the duty circle
of Eve’s pulse is 100ps/10ns=0.001. Thus the average
optical power is reduced to 0.6mW × 0.001 = 0.6µW .
A classical photodetector with a discrimination voltage
can be used to monitor the intensity of pulsed light. How-
ever, the classical photodetector could also be cheated
due to the following two reasons.
First, the classical photodetector can be damaged by
bright light so that it may not work as expected. There
are two kinds of classical photodetectors: one based on
the PIN, and the other one based on the APD. Both can
be damaged by bright light [13]. For example, the detec-
tor based on InGaAs-APD from Thorlabs has a maximal
input power 10mW (model: APD310) and 1mW (model:
APD110C). The maximal input power for the detector
based on InGaAs-PIN from Thorlabs (model: PDA8GS)
is about 1mW for cw and 20mW for 60ms [49].
Second, the finite bandwidth of the classical photode-
tector may worsen the monitoring results. We experi-
mentally measure the amplitude of an electrical signal
using an oscilloscope with various bandwidth (Fig.6(a)).
Furthermore, the theoretical amplitudes of an ideal Gaus-
sian pulse which passes a linear time-invariant ideal low-
pass filter are also shown in Fig.6(b)-(c). Generally
speaking, when a signal pulse, f(t), passes a linear time-
invariant device, its amplitude function becomes
g(t) =
∫ ∞
−∞
G(ω)F [f(t)]eiωtdω, (A1)
where F [·] is the Fourier transformation, and G(ω) is
the frequency response function of device. It clearly
shows that devices with finite bandwidth will filter high-
frequency signals, and reduce the amplitude of a signal
pulse. For simply, we assume that the signal is Gaussian
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Part(a) shows the experimentally mea-
sured pulse amplitudes by directly inputting an electrical sig-
nal with amplitude 1V and 3dB width 100ps into an oscil-
loscope (model: DSOX93304Q, Agilent) with various band-
width 1GHz, 5GHz, and 10GHz. The electrical signal is
generated from a Patter Generator (model: 12050, Picosec-
ond). Part(b) and Part(c) show the theoretical amplitude of
an ideal Gaussian pulse which passes an ideal low-pass fil-
ter. ∆x is the 3dB width of the Gaussian signal. ω0 is the
maximal bandwidth of the low-pass filter. In part(b), we set
∆x = 100ps. The mismatch between experiment (part(a))
and theory (part(b)) is mainly due to the simplified version
of our model. All the results show that the monitor devices
with finite bandwidth can not faithfully characterize the input
signal.
pulse and the device is an ideal low-pass filter, that is,
f(t) = exp[−
t2
2σ2
],
G(ω) =
{
1 |ω| ≤ ω0
0 |ω| > ω0
.
(A2)
Here σ is the standard deviation of a signal pulse f(x). If
the 3dB width of f(x) is noted as ∆x, it is easy to check
that ∆x =
√
8 ln(2)σ. ω0 is the maximal bandwidth of
the ideal low-pass filter.
The theoretical amplitude of g(t) is shown in Fig.5(b)-
(c) of the main text. The results clearly show that moni-
toring devices with finite bandwidth could not faithfully
characterize the factual amplitude of the input signal,
and Eve could foil the monitoring devices with a sharp
pulsed signal. Although the test of Fig.6 is performed for
an electrical signal, the results can be directly applied to
the photodetector with finite bandwidth. For example,
suppose that the gain and discrimination voltage of the
photodetector are 104 V/W and 0.2 V, and that Eve uses
a pulsed control light with a 3dB width of 100ps and a
peak power of 100µW . Then the expected output voltage
of the photodetector should be 1V, which is much larger
than the discrimination voltage, 0.2V.
7Fig.5 of the main text also shows that if the bandwidth
of Alice’s photodetector is high enough (e.g., > 5GHz),
Eve can be discovered. (Note that generally speaking,
the gain of photodetector will be decreased when the
bandwidth is increased. But here we simply assume the
gain is independent of the bandwidth.) However, if the
bandwidth of photodetector is limited (e.g., 1GHz), the
factual output voltage is lower than the discrimination
voltage, 0.2V. Alice can not discover the existence of
Eve. Note that Fig.2 of the main text has shown that
100µW is sufficient for Eve to break the phase random-
ization assumption. Furthermore, a recent paper also
shows other imperfections in a practical monitoring pho-
todetector [43].
Therefore, the possible countermeasure of Fig.3(b) of
the main text could be cheated by Eve, if the devices are
not carefully configured. Furthermore, illumination by a
bright light changes not only the phase but also the pulse
waveform, including its width, amplitude, and shape. Al-
though we still do not know how Eve can obtain more
information by exploiting such a modified waveform, it
remains possible for Eve to attack the QKD system.
Appendix B: A simple discussion about Fig.5
Fig.5 of the main text clearly shows that when the sig-
nal laser is illuminated by bright light, the pulse shape
would also be changed. Generally speaking, the addi-
tional changes are helpful for both Eve and the legitimate
parties. More imperfections can be exploited by Eve to
spy the final key, and more parameters can be monitored
by Alice to discover the existence of Eve. But it is still
possible for Eve to perform our attack.
Theoretically speaking, Eve could perform a suitable
attack to ensure that the modification of the pulse shape
would not increase the error rate between Alice and Bob.
In fact, Eve can perform the intercept-and-resend attack,
and ensure that the error rate is lower than a reason-
able value. For example, in the system with multi-laser
diodes, she first measures the time-shift of each laser
diode to determine Alice’s state. Then she can resend
a faked state to Bob according to her measurement re-
sults. In this case, if the time-shift is distinguishable for
each laser diode (it is possible according to Fig.5), Eve
could know the state sent by Alice. Then she can resend
a perfect faked state to Bob according to her measure-
ment. Thus no additional error will be introduced, and
the legitimate parties could not discover the existence of
Eve by monitoring the error rate.
Therefore, the main battlefield for Alice and Eve is the
monitor devices, and both of them must be very careful
in the cat-and-mouse game.
For Alice, she may discover the existence of Eve by
carefully monitoring the parameters of the signal laser.
But since the change is tiny in some parameters, some ad-
vanced devices with high speed and bandwidth (e.g., pho-
todetectors, analog-digital convertors, or time-amplitude
convertors, and so on) are required for Alice, which may
dramatically increase the technology challenge and cost
of a practical Alice. For example, the time-shift for ID300
lasers is about 100ps; thus if Alice wanted to characterize
the time-shift of her pulses, the bandwidth and sample
rate of Alice’s analog-digital convertor should be larger
than 40GHz (generally speaking, at least four points are
needed to recover a pulse). Furthermore, the bandwidth
and sample rate should be increased for homemade lasers
(see Fig.5 of the main text for HM-1 and HM-2), since
much smaller changes are introduced.
For Eve’s part, she should carefully configure her at-
tack to foil Alice’s monitor devices. (1) Eve may care-
fully stable her controlling laser, and match the optical
frequency of her controlling laser with that of Alice’s sig-
nal laser, so that, excepting the random phase, many tiny
changes will be introduced on the pulse shape. Taking
the homemade lasers (HM-1 and HM-2) as an example,
Eve’s light will correlate the phase of each of the pulses
(see Fig.2 (c) and (d) of the main text), but Fig.5 (c)
and (d) of the main text show that the changes of pulse
shape are very tiny (At least, compared with ID300-1 and
ID300-2, we do not find any obvious changes in the pulse
shape using a photodetector with 40GHz bandwidth, an
oscilloscope with 33GHz bandwidth and a sample rate
of 80GHz, thus if Alice wants to discover the changed
shape of HM-1 and HM-2, advanced devices with higher
bandwidth and sample rate are required. (2) Eve may
reduce the risk of being discovered by spying parts (not
all) of final key. For example, it has been proven that
a small fluctuation of intensity will dramatically reduce
the secret key rate of decoy state BB84 protocol [50].
Thus she still could obtain parts of final key by trivially
changing the intensity of Alice’s signal laser. In fact,
it had been shown that, if the intensity of Alice’s sig-
nal pulses fluctuates 1%, 2% and 3%, the final key rate
will be reduced by 11.86%, 23.91% and 36.17% [50] (The
simulation was performed based on the experimental pa-
rameters of Ref.[34](b) ).
Furthermore, generally speaking, the ability for Eve to
change other parameters in an optical signal may actually
benefit Eve more than Alice and Bob. This is because
Eve could well be a spy or work for a national security
agency such as the NSA, and so Eve has a much larger
budget than Alice and Bob, and thus is probably in a
better position to exploit the imperfections that she has
introduced in the quantum signal.
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